Anatomy of the 2012 Cubs

C     2.0 [1.2]
1B   2.0 [1.8]
2B   2.5 [2.5]
SS   2.5 [3.3]
3B   2.8 [0.9]
RF   2.7 [1.7]
CF   3.0 [1.0]
LF   2.5 [4.0]
C2 [0.5] [0.5]
O4 [0.5] [0.6]
O5 [0.5] [-2.1]
I5   [0.5] [0.7]
I6   [0.5] [0.0]
Position: 22.5 [16.0]

SP   4.5 [3.3]
SP   2.7 [2.1]
SP   2.0 [1.4]
SP   1.3 [1.2]
SP   0.6 [0.7]
RP   1.5 [0.7]
RP   1.0 [0.6]
RP   0.7 [0.2]
RP   0.5 [0.1]
RP   0.4 [0.1]
RP   0.2 [0.1]
RP   0.1 [0.0]
Pitching: 15.5 [10.5]

26.5 + 43 = 69.5 wins from 25-man roster

This makes sense, to me. This 25-man roster probably played 80% of all innings this year, so 26.5 * .8 = 21.2 wins, which when you add to 43 gives you 64 wins, within my tolerance for 61 actual wins. This of course assumes a complete replacement sum of 0 from our non-opening 25; this is a dubious proposition at the very best (and likely the main driver as to why we won 61 instead of 64 – our replacement pitching was embarassingly below replacement).

The main things I take from this is that the Cubs last year lacked an ace pitcher, a competent bullpen, a third baseman, a proper right and centerfielder, a third baseman, a 5th outfielder, and a 6th infielder. These are things we already knew, but now I can kind of order them by need:

1. Centerfielder
2. Third baseman
3. Ace Pitcher
4. Rightfielder
5. Ace reliever (closer)
6. #2 pitcher
7. #3 pitcher
8. Fireman reliever
9. Utility infielder
10. Utility outfielder

Though the 5th outfielder is technically the largest gap in WAR, I am assuming that replacement level players are plentiful (because they are).

In the next post, I’ll see how the Cubs are addressing these 10 needs (if they are at all).

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