C 2.0 [1.2]
1B 2.0 [1.8]
2B 2.5 [2.5]
SS 2.5 [3.3]
3B 2.8 [0.9]
RF 2.7 [1.7]
CF 3.0 [1.0]
LF 2.5 [4.0]
C2 [0.5] [0.5]
O4 [0.5] [0.6]
O5 [0.5] [-2.1]
I5 [0.5] [0.7]
I6 [0.5] [0.0]
Position: 22.5 [16.0]
SP 4.5 [3.3]
SP 2.7 [2.1]
SP 2.0 [1.4]
SP 1.3 [1.2]
SP 0.6 [0.7]
RP 1.5 [0.7]
RP 1.0 [0.6]
RP 0.7 [0.2]
RP 0.5 [0.1]
RP 0.4 [0.1]
RP 0.2 [0.1]RP 0.1 [0.0]
Pitching: 15.5 [10.5]
26.5 + 43 = 69.5 wins from 25-man roster
This makes sense, to me. This 25-man roster probably played 80% of all innings this year, so 26.5 * .8 = 21.2 wins, which when you add to 43 gives you 64 wins, within my tolerance for 61 actual wins. This of course assumes a complete replacement sum of 0 from our non-opening 25; this is a dubious proposition at the very best (and likely the main driver as to why we won 61 instead of 64 – our replacement pitching was embarassingly below replacement).
The main things I take from this is that the Cubs last year lacked an ace pitcher, a competent bullpen, a third baseman, a proper right and centerfielder, a third baseman, a 5th outfielder, and a 6th infielder. These are things we already knew, but now I can kind of order them by need:
1. Centerfielder
2. Third baseman
3. Ace Pitcher
4. Rightfielder
5. Ace reliever (closer)
6. #2 pitcher
7. #3 pitcher
8. Fireman reliever
9. Utility infielder
10. Utility outfielder
Though the 5th outfielder is technically the largest gap in WAR, I am assuming that replacement level players are plentiful (because they are).
In the next post, I’ll see how the Cubs are addressing these 10 needs (if they are at all).