Author: GW

The Ghosts of Free Agency Future

In the aftermath of the recently announced deal with the city to renovate Wrigley Field, Theo Epstein spoke to the media about its potential benefits to the team:

Our payroll now is third in the division. That’s fine. But it should be first in the division. So this is one of the ways that we’re going to get there.

It should be, we are on the same page. And this is one of the ways to get there. Still with you. I'm just struggling to figure out what the other ways are. Because this…

some aggressiveness in free agency

…I have to be honest, I don't see it.

Perhaps the greatest fault of the Cubs organization circa the late Hendry era was it's reluctance to invest in the minor league system. While other teams were stockpiling compensation picks, luring players from college with massive late-round bonuses, and throwing money around on the international free agent market, the Cubs mostly demurred.* When Theo was hired, he pledged to change all that, and no doubt he would have were it not for the new CBA, which hit like an angry Carlos Quentin and abruptly ended most of those practices. And while the new CBA was a shock, most of us figured: "hey, it's a setback, but there's always free agency." However, a new trend was slowly building and has now nearly overwhelmed the game. No one is making it to free agency any more. Prospects that the Cubs were busy not acquiring years ago are now being locked up well into their 30s, just long enough to get past the time when other teams would have any desire to sign them. 

*The exception being 2011, of course, when Hendry got either religion or a mandate from upstairs to spend big.

Don't believe me? First, I used Fangraphs to find a list of all the players who accumulated at least 5 wins above replacement between the 2010 and 2012. An average player is worth about 2 WAR per season, so this is a fairly low hurdle to clear. It captures more or less everyone who has had a good season for two out of the last three years. Then I used Cot's and Baseball-Reference to determine when each of these players could potentially reach free agency. I filtered out everyone who will be 30 or older by the time they get there. The front office has repeatedly emphasized the importance of acquiring young players close to the prime of their careers. These are the players that they want to spend money on, the building block pieces which would presumably be at the heart of any effort to lead the NL Central in payroll.

Behold, I give you free agency future:

* Club Option

** Two Club Options

+ Two Player Options

2014

Phil Hughes, P, 28

Seriously. That's it.

2015

Pablo Sandoval, 3B, 28

Asdrubal Cabrera, SS, 29

Billy Butler, DH, 29*

Dexter Fowler, CF, 29

Colby Rasmus, CF, 29

Clayton Kershaw, SP, 27

Johnny Cueto, SP, 29*

Yovani Gallardo, SP, 29*

Homer Bailey, SP, 29

If you think Clayton Kershaw will make it to free agency, then either you believe he's on the verge of a catastrophic arm injury, or you are blissfully unaware of the goings-on in LA over the last 11 months. Otherwise, there are some decent pieces there. We can assume a few marginal players will take a step up over the next two years to join this group. Overall, that's not likely to change the way this looks, which is decidedly fair to middling.

2016

Jason Heyward, OF, 26

Austin Jackson, OF, 29

Justin Upton, OF, 28

Alex Avila, C, 29

Gerardo Parra, OF, 29

Mat Latos, SP, 28

Jaime Garcia, SP, 29 **

Rick Porcello, SP, 27

Trevor Cahill, SP, 28 +

Jhoulys Chacin, SP, 28

And now we find ourselves in 2016, the last for which Theo is under contract. If we are lucky, this could project as really good year for the Cubs. And it could be a banner year for free agents, but that is really anyone's guess given how many things could change between now and then. Some of these guys will fall off, and they will be joined by others who breakout. If the early extension model continues, many of them won't make it to the market. My guess, though, is that by then a few marginal guys will have been overpaid to such an extent in free agency that some will decide that waiting is worth the risk. And the Cubs will aggressively pursue them. In 2016.

My point is not that the Cubs are doomed.* There are a few 30 year olds barely missing my age cutoff that would make each of these classes look better. However, avoiding guys over 30 is central to what the front office is trying to accomplish (namely, sustained success). It seems clear to me that the Cubs will be forced to do a lot of things they would rather not: pony up for guys over 30, take on good players with bad contracts from other teams, ship out prospects to smaller market clubs to get a crack at extending bigger names, and pray to Jeff Samardzija Jesus that his will be done, role players be transformed, and prospects pan out. 

*The Cubs are probably doomed.

Mark Appel Could Pitch in the Majors This Year

Keith Law, ESPN super-scout, has been talking 2013 draft lately. I happened to hear him on two podcasts today; he spent a few moments talking specifically about Mark Appel (at approximately the 40′ mark). Appel has been discussed around here of late. If I had to bet on who the Cubs will end up with at #2, he would be atop the list.

Mark Appel

Law thinks that Appel and University of Oklahoma righty Jonathan Gray make up the clear top tier in the draft. Interestingly, Law thinks that Appel could start in AA and be a September callup this season, finding his way into the regular rotation in 2014 after service time shenanigans are exhausted.

I think he’s pretty close to ready… He’s got the fastball, he’s shown that slider that was just kind of good last year, is now really an out pitch for him. He’s been much more aggressive. In fact, the biggest criticism I’ve heard of him so far is that he’s much much better pitching in the comforts of home, at Stanford, than he is on the road. To me, if that’s the worst thing you can say about a pitcher, than he’s probably pretty good. With the experience level and the command and the entire repertoire, I don’t think he needs a lot of time in the minors at all.

In discussing other candidates for the top of the first round in an interview with Law, Kiley McDaniel said he thinks the consensus top tier includes Clint Frazier (CF, HS), Sean Manaea (LHP, Indiana State), and Kris Bryant (3B, San Diego). That tier is closely followed by Colin Moran (3B, North Carolina) and Austin Meadows (CF, HS). The two of them agreed that it was a weak draft for college positional players as well as high school pitchers.

Jim Leyland Just Wants to Chillax

smokingjimFrom the "some of us suspected this all along" department:

The Tigers have yet to name a closer for the upcoming season. Rookie favorite Bruce Rondon has been erratic this spring, with quality setup men Joaquin Benoit and Phil Coke performing reasonably well. A trade is also a possibility, and Carlos Marmol's name has come up.*

*Obligatory Cubs tie-in

Typically when managers are asked about possibly using a committee-based approach, they provide some version of "You don't know what you are talking about. That will never work. We are currently performing functional MRIs on all the candidates to identify the one with a closer's mentality… No, it's simply not possible for more than one of them to score well on that test."

Jim Leyland has apparently decided "to hell with all that" and just given an honest answer:

And you automatically understand — and this sounds kind of selfish, but I told you this all along — there is no question that it makes it a hundred times better when you have a closer that is a closer — and a good one — because it takes a lot of pressure off the manager.

We can (talk) all we want, but I can tell you right now that if we have to mix-and-match, it will be a second-guessing-haven delight. Because if you use Coke, well, why didn't use Benoit? If you used Benoit, well, why didn't you use Villarreal, if he's on the team? If you use Villarreal, why didn't you use Alburquerque? He was fresh. I'm supposed to know how to use my pitching, so that doesn't bother me. But when you don't have a closer, you're open game."

That quote was from March 5th, and the darn thing still hasn't resolved itself. Leyland, for one, is none-to pleased.

Sometimes people get hung up on something, and they're relentless about it until they think they're going to get an answer. They're not going to get an answer until I have an answer, but they've been browbeating me every day for I don't know how many days. I've always tried to maintain my patience, which I will… But I don't know who the closer is right now. I don't know what the team is. I've got 95 percent of the team, but I don't know how some situations will work out. You guys can ask for the next six days and it's not going to make any difference to me because I can't give you information that I don't have. I truly don't know.

Leyland brings up an area which has yet to be addressed by the analytics community: manager comfort. How many more games could a team win if it's manager was provided with a dugout recliner, a couple of xanax, and a loaded-up ipod? The marginal cost would be tiny compared to acquiring better players. 

After all, all these day-to-day managerial decisions can really take a toll. I mean, there's already the lineup and the bunting and stuff. Not to mention keeping these guys ready to play. And then you actually have to make a decision about which pitcher will come into the game? Rough. I mean, ordinarily you would be OK with that, but you just know those half-wits in the press are going to be all over your ass if it goes wrong. I'm completely with you on this one, Jim. In fact, might I suggest hiring some peon to make all the tough calls for you?

Leylandandhisladies

The Cubs Have Tried to Extend Jeff Samardzija Twice

John Heyman passes along a few nuggets today with respect to the Cubs' efforts to extend Jeff Samardzija. JefF7 is three years from free agency, and the Cubs have apparently made two distinct efforts to extend him, to no avail. The two are apparently far enough apart that talks are on hold. We have had some word about this previously, but Heyman provides more:

Word is, the Cubs' offer was "well above" the nearly $30 million, five-year deal the Rangers gave Derek Holland last spring, though with Samardzija a year closer to free agency (he has three years to go) and other factors, he's believe to be seeking something in an entirely different ballpark.

This is more evidence that the front office is not afraid to make decisions based on one year's worth of performance. A year ago, it seemed as if Samardzija was pitching his way towards unemployment and the decision to move him to the rotation was laughable around these parts. The Cubs seem satisfied enough with his 2012 performance to want Samardzija at least through his age-32 season, though obviously not enough to match his demands.

samardzija-cubs

As Heyman mentions, Samardzija obviously isn't lacking in confidence, as another strong season would likely drive up his price substantially. His refusal to accept a deal likely also reflects an understanding of the free agent market, as his next deal is likely to be the largest of his career, and he will be more attractive to suitors following his age 30 season than if he is extended. It probably also doesn't hurt that Samardzija hauled in a significant bonus in the draft, and based on that financial security can take a riskier position at this point in his career.

No Geeks Allowed: Sabermetrics on the Field

300francona_book

There are at least a dozen major league teams that gobble up sophisticated analysts from all corners and use them in any way they can conceive of to improve their valuation of personnel. For years, I wished that the Cubs would be one of those teams, and now that they are, I couldn't be happier about it. But it's not 2003 anymore. What kind of gains can be expected from an analytical front office when there are at least a handful of others who are equally adept at analyzing the numbers?

That's why I'm flummoxed as to why not a single team has placed an analyst in charge of on-field strategy. At least once every other game, I see a manager make a decision that seems obviously wrong, and I don't usually pay attention. Starters are left in too long, platoon advantage opportunities are ignored, closers are left sitting on their asses during high-leverage moments, lineups are ridiculously composed, bunts are altogether too frequent (as is normal), or not frequent enough (in the case of severe defensive shifts), and these are just the obvious errors. Browse through MGL's archives over at The Book Blog for a while to find an obssesive's take on in-game mistakes.

It's easy to understand why these errors are made. The right decision is only marginally better than the wrong one, and the typical major league manager has with his own eyes observed the wrong choice paying off time and again. He is emotionally involved with every pitch and is biased by his interactions with his players in getting them ready to play. Understanding of sound strategy requires large datasets and often simulations. Why should we expect someone who has spent his life focusing on the mechanics of the game to also have a grasp of the numbers? The pool from which managers are selected consists strictly of former players, many of whom didn't graduate from college and have never taken even an "Introduction to Statistics" course.

Terry Francona has been making the media rounds lately in support of his newly published book. The media is predictably taking the opportunity to point and stare at the perceived dysfunction in the Red Sox organization, but I'm more interested to Francona's description of his interaction with Theo Epstein.

In an interview with Bill Simmons, Francona indicated that he was closer to Theo than anyone else in the front office. Peter Abraham points out that Francona frequently clashed with the ownership group, and Theo had to bridge the gap. When Simmons asked specifically about his biggest disagreement with Theo (at approximately the 21 minute mark), Francona had this to say:

Me and Theo, probably our biggest [disagreement] was whether Pap should be a closer or a starter. I always viewed Pap as a closer, and I think Theo always wanted him to somehow start his big league career out in the bullpen, and then transition into the rotation. And it was just a philosophical difference; we never came to blows, but I think that was one we probably differed on. We actually differed on a lot of things, which is healthy. And we had the ability to either talk it out or yell it out, and then the next day, we would be back to normal, which I think is really healthy.

The Abraham post also gives this interesting tidbit:

Epstein hired two "outside consultants" to put together proposed lineups for Francona every day… Francona never met them and he wasn't mandated to use their lineups. But at one point Francona told Epstein he had enough of the suggestions and to keep them to himself.

Francona clearly had the final say in decisions on the field, and I doubt that the situation is different than that of Dale Sveum in Chicago.

It seems to me that sabermetric front offices seek out managers who are of above average intelligence and seem open to considering new ideas. This approach may be conducive to a better working relationship within the organization, but I have yet to see any substantive differences in strategy, save for a defensive shift here or there.

The Cubs are owned by an MBA who gave over complete control of baseball operations to an analytically-minded GM. That GM came in with an excess of goodwill given by a long-suffering fanbase. If you can't give an analyst control of strategy in that set of circumstances, when can you?

Which is more difficult, finding an analyst who is good at interacting with people or finding a former baseball player who is comfortable writing code and dealing with large datasets? There is no need to eliminate coaches in this hypothetical, there is only a need to delegate responsibility.

Eventually there will be analysts in the dugout, of this I have no doubt. And once again I'll be left wondering why the Cubs couldn't be first movers and how long it will take them to catch up to the innovators in the league.

Cubs Sign Scott Hairston

The Cubs have come to an agreement with outfielder Scott Hairston on a two year deal that could be worth up to six million dollars. The signing was originally reported by Ken Rosenthal and has since been confirmed by Bruce Levine.

2013 will be Hairston's 33 year old season. His career has consisted of mostly part-time work, first with Diamondbacks, followed by the Padres, then the A's, and most recently the Mets. He came up in 2004 as a second basemen, but has since spent most of his time in a corner outfield role.

There could be some upside to this deal. Hairston can hit lefties (119 career OPS+), has some power (95 career homers in 2200 PA), and doesn't seem to be terrible on defense. He has spent most of his career in pitchers' parks and could conceivably get a boost by moving to Wrigley. Also, he is the brother of former Cub Jerry Hairston Jr. Due to the fickle randomness inherent in birthing orders, Scott has not the honor of carrying on his father's name, and has spent his life seeking to find favor with the patriarch through the development of a swing capable of producing power unmatched by his older sibling. (I assume).

On the other hand, Hairston's career high in plate appearances is 464. His career OBP is .302. His desirability as a free agent is largely based on his surprising 2012, when hit 20 homers in 398 PA, and breakout years from old players are not to be trusted.

On the whole the signing falls under the category of "Is This It?", as has been typical of moves during the Epstein/Hoyer regime. The club has collected mediocre players on short term deals for low prices while they try to figure out what to do in the long term. I don't think it's an accident that this move comes on the heels of Buster Olney reporting that the Diamondbacks are weighing an offer to send Justin Upton to the Braves. The front office isn't willing to match that asking price at this stage of the game, so we will have to deal with platoon types like David DeJesus, Nate Schierholtz, and Hairston for the time being. If you squint hard, you can see a 2013 roster that could finish .500 if all the breaks fall their way, but will probably be closer to 70 wins than 80.

Hey, at least he is better than Dave Sappelt.

DBacks Want To Trade Upton or Kubel by Friday

Buster Olney is keeping tabs on the persistent logjam in the Arizona outfield. He has posted a few interesting tidbits via twitter today.

The Braves currently have Heyward in right and Prado in left (with BJ in center, incidentally). They are likely penciling Prado in at second, or perhaps even third should this deal go through.

I still wouldn't be surprised to see the Cubs make a run, but we haven't heard anything about that lately.

The Next Generation of Cub Players and Plate Discipline

baezclippedThe Cubs Convention took place this past weekend. OV's own Aisle424 was present and will summarize his thoughts on it shortly (I think). In the meantime, Josh has already weighed in. Bruce Miles was all over the goings-on, as well, and his twitter feed is well worth checking out. A couple of highlights:

I know the sheen is off the new front office for some, but I still take comfort in the little things, like their understanding of how runs are generated in baseball. In 2012, Almora, Baez, and Soler combined to walk 30 times in 675 plate appearances. That's good for a 4.4% rate, which is not good at all.

Compare these quotes to erstwhile minor league director Oneri Fleita on Josh Vitters near the start of the 2011 season:

There are times when Vitters is too patient at the plate.

Coming in to the 2011 season, Vitters had walked 56 times in 1269 plate appearances. That is good for, you guessed it, a 4.4% rate.

There is something to be said for not calling out young players in public, and there is even a case to be made for not fiddling too much with a player's approach. Fleita himself made this case in to Kevin Goldstein:

You just let guys like that play. I learned a long time ago that guys who can hit .300 with power, you can teach them to hit .200 with no power, so when they have that much talent, you let them write their own script.

The bottom line, though, is that Cubs' system has a plate discipline problem, and has had that problem for as long as I can remember. The talent has not been good enough to let the players "write their own script." The difference between The Thoyer and Hendry Eras is that the former publicly acknowledges that it's a really big deal, and is evidently going to do everything they can to fix it. Jabronis like me can appreciate that.

Rethinking Pitching Philosophies, Derek Johnson, and Carlos Gomez

Cubs Den has a post up drawing attention to a Baseball America article on changes in the Cubs’ organizational philosophy related to developing pitching talent. The BA piece focuses on new pitching coordinator Derek Johnson, formerly the pitching coach at Vanderbilt, which famously produced David Price, Mike Minor, Sonny Gray, and many others on his watch. Johnson is of the school of thought that pitchers today generally don’t throw enough, and is an advocate of long toss as a method of building up arm strength. While I don’t know enough to have strong opinions on that matter, it did remind of Carlos Gomez, who in a brief stint writing for The Hardball Times in 2007 meticulously dissected pitching and hitting mechanics from scouting videos.

Gomez is currently the international scouting director for the LAAofAA, having also served in that role for the Diamondbacks. The BA article reminded me of Gomez because it was in one of his pieces that I first became aware of Derek Johnson.

Vanderbilt’s pitching coach, Derek Johnson, and I share many views on mechanics. By the way, Mr. Johnson knows what he’s talking about. Send your kids to Vanderbilt to get the best pitching instruction possible.

What exactly are Gomez’s views?

For the most part, I prefer “athletes who pitch.” Athletes move quickly. Athletes get it and go and don’t think about it too much…I like violence. I like aggressive, twisting sonsabitches who “go after it.”

His scouting breakdowns predictably praised pitchers who drifted through their balance point, took long, aggressive strides toward the plate, and accompanied their approaches with short arm actions. This positive take on Jake Peavy is a typical example, as is this criticism of newly-signed Cub Dontrelle Willis. I don’t think it’s safe to assume that Johnson and Gomez agree on all the finer points of pitching, but I would guess is there is considerable overlap. 

Gomez definitely has some retrospective misses in his prospect evaluation, but on the whole, he does pretty well. Take his top five pitchers from the 2007 draft, for example:

1) LHP David Price, Devil Rays (First overall)
2) RHP Rick Porcello, Tigers (27th overall)
3) RHP Jarrod Parker, DiamondBacks (ninth overall)
4) LHP Madison Bumgarner, Giants (tenth overall)
5) RHP Casey Weathers, Rockies (eighth overall)

He also happens to be the first scout I read who at all criticized Josh Vitters‘s swing:

However, Vitters seems to get “extended” maybe even farther in front than Moustakas, and does not let the ball travel deep into the zone…(Bad in terms of power.)

If you have some free time, it’s worth browsing his archives. They are interesting in their own right, and may indirectly shed some light on the organization’s current take on pitching.

“This, man, I was just jerking myself off.” An FJM retrospective

The Classical has put together an extended interview with Ken Tremendous, dak, and Junior chronicling the history of Fire Joe Morgan.

My wife and I took a trip, I think, to Buenos Aires. And we were in the airport… we were getting on the plane and a guy came up to me and said, “Hey, I just want to tell you that I’m a big fan.” And I was like, “Oh, thank you.” And he said, “Yeah, I read the site all the time.” And I was like, “You’re not talking about the TV show The Office?” And that was the first time my wife was like, “What the fuck is going on?”

Lots of good stuff in there that I had forgotten about, including the famous superbike piece, which may or may not have been written by the guy who is now running the Pirates' minor league system.  The guys also talk about their interactions with the writers they skewered, making friends with Brandon McCarthy, and how tone on the internet changed such that near the end of their run they had trouble distinguishing satire.