Better Know a Cub – Page 2

Better Know a Cub: Mike Montgomery, LHP

Today’s an off day and what better way to spend it then discussing the recent trade between the Chicago Cubs and Seattle Mariners. The Cubs sent off 1B/DH Dan Vogelbach and RHP Paul Blackburn in return for LHP Mike Montgomery and RHP Jordan Pries.

We’ll spend this post focusing on the more prominent name in Montgomery. Mike was drafted out of high school in the supplemental round (36th overall) of the 2008 draft when the Royals lost free agent David Riske to the Brewers (side note: Riske went on to give up 41 runs in 66.2 innings with the Brewers before getting run out of baseball).

Mike progressed quickly through the minors reaching AA by age 20 and AAA by age 21. Here’s how the prospect world viewed him during the those years:

Baseball America:
Pre-2010: Rated #39 Prospect
Pre-2011: Rated #19 Prospect
Pre-2012: Rated #23 Prospect

Prospect Ratings by MLB.com:
Pre-2012: Rated #31 Prospect

Prospect Ratings by BaseballProspectus.com:
Pre-2010: Rated #36 Prospect
Pre-2011: Rated #21 Prospect

Montgomery dominated the low minors. While Mike still progressed to AA and AAA, his FIP skyrocketed as he rose through the Royals system. He posted a 4.88 FIP in AAA in 2011 with his K/9 down to 7.71 and BB/9 jumped to 4.12 where we was previously around 8 K/9 and 2 BB/9.

That trend continued in 2012 and the Royals traded him along with Jake Odorizzi and Will Myers to the Tampa Bay Rays for Wade Davis and James Shields. 2013 wasn’t much better in the Rays organization, but things started to turn around a little bit.

Year	WHIP	ERA	K/9	BB/9
2012	1.624	6.07	6.7	3.8
2013	1.457	4.83	6.7	3.9
2014	1.310	4.29	7.0	3.4
2015	1.194	4.13	8.0	2.6

*I’d have normally done FIP but BR does have FIP for the MiLB and FG doesn’t summarize by year.

Here’s what Sickels had to say when he saw him back in 2011 (the first year he started to struggle):

In that inning, Montgomery’s fastball was 90-92 MPH, thrown high in the zone with little movement. His slider was flat, and he was telegraphing his curveball; you could tell it was going to be the curve before he released it. He was fooling nobody, his location was off, and he gave up the four runs. However, in the second inning, and for the rest of the game, he looked like a different pitcher. His fastball kicked up to 91-93, with life low in the strike zone. His slider got much sharper, he did a better job selling the curveball, and he mixed in some solid changeups.

For a bigger summation of various scouting reports, the Royals Review blog over at SB Nation did a good job here.

Prior to 2015 the Rays traded Montgomery to the Mariners for RHP Erasmo Ramirez. He broke into the majors in 2015 starting 16 games with a 4.67 FIP. The Mariners put him in the bullpen in 2016 where he’s had much better success to the tune of 7.88 K/9 | 2.63 BB/9 | 3.20 FIP. Specifically, he has a .241 wOBA against left handed batters so far in 20 innings and 78 batters faced.

Baseball America rated his changeup the best in the Royals system in 2011 and 2012. However, so far in 2016 his changeup usage is down to 9.1% compared to 20.4% in his 16 major league starts in 2015. He changeup in 2015 was actually his worst pitch in 2015 with a -3.1 runs above average. He’s throwing more fastballs and curveballs with fewer cutters and changeups. He fastball velocity is up to 93.4 compared to 90.9 as a starter.

This is all to say, well, I have no freaking clue what to expect for him. From the scouting reports I’ve read, no one can put a finger on why Montgomery struggled for years. He doesn’t have an injury history. I’m sure Chris Bosio will get his hands on him and hopefully do his magic. I don’t think he will be Clayton Richard bad which is a plus. He does have some upside and the pedigree. Don’t forget that not too long ago Andrew Miller was a failed starting pitcher. Crazier things have happened.

Better Know a Cub: Dexter Fowler

Yesterday, the Cubs spun Lou Goodvalue and Dan Straily into their (presumable) starting CF for 2015. A short eulogy for Luis Valbuena follows.

Valbuena was underrated by the general population and probably slightly overrated by the blogging community (and with his batflips, it’s easy to see why). Valbuena was cheap, able to play anywhere on the diamond, and he took his walks. While he had an OPS+ of 114 last year, it was his first season as even an average offensive player. Valbuena will get the lion’s share of starts in Houston (Matt Dominguez will also be in play), which he definitely would not have gotten had he stayed. Best of luck, Luis. We’ll always have the batflips.

Pedigree

Dexter Fowler was a 14th round pick in the 2004 draft, by the Colorado Rockies. After 3 good-but-not-great years in the low minors (that saw him bloom into a Top 100 prospect), he erupted in 2008 to the tune of .335/.431/.515. He parlayed that into a the #15 BA ranking and a swift call-up in 2009 (he received a cup in 2008).

Fowler was pretty effective immediately. In 2009, he batted .266/.363/.406, with 27 SB (and 10 CS). For good measure, he also had 10 triples. Fowler has replicated that same line (or slightly better) every year since.

Offense

There is a lot to like about Fowler offensively. Since 2009 (his first year in the majors), he’s been 19th overall in walks, without the power of any of his contemporaries. Fowler’s career SLG is .422, the lowest of the top 24 walkers. In fact, he doesn’t have half of the HRs of the next-least total above him (Carlos Santana, 98).

There’s a lot to be said about a player who can draw walks without being a threat to leave the yard. Fowler will likely never approach 15 HR in a season, but he routinely walks 65 times a season. Fowler grinds at-bats out, and that results in a higher-than-average strikeout rate. However, that’s not really important, because a 7-pitch AB that ends in a strikeout is still pretty valuable.

As stated before, Fowler doesn’t exactly inspire the fear of the boomstick at the plate. His ISO is routinely in the .140-.150 region, and it dropped to .122 in Minute Maid (he’s projected by Steamer to have a .252/.353/.379 slash, but I’m not sure if that’s re-park adjusted). However, it’s not like Fowler is anemic at the plate. The league average ISO was .135 last year. On the whole, Fowler is a solid hitter with prodigious patience. You want a guy like Fowler leading off every game, and he will. Splits are also not a concern (.770 vs RHP, .823 vs LHP).

You might also worry that Fowler is a Coors Effect guy. While it no doubt aided his triple totals, and there was a pronounced split going from home to away (.873 to .700), the lion’s share was due to a huge increase in slugging at Coors (which happens to everyone). Fowler also had a decent year away from Coors in 2014. I’m not overly worried about it.

Defense

Fowler comes with some warts. There’s no real metric that grades Fowler out at anything better than below-average. He can play CF, and he has speed at the position, but never translated into additional outs in the outfield. In fact, he’s about .2 outs per 9 behind the league average at the position. There are some possible explanations, seeing as he’s played in Coors and Minute Maid. However, those are two very different parks. I’m not sure what their effects are in total, but the long and short of it is that he has poor range despite decent foot speed.

This represents one of my larger misgivings about this team. Currently constructed, the Cubs are rolling with a Coghlan/Fowler/Soler OF. All 3 of those figure to have below-average range. The Cubs are going to mitigate that concern by loading up on groundballs, but it’s not feasible to anticipate avoiding fly balls altogether. Our outfield defense might be among the worst in the league, and it might get worse if Bryant ends up there. Given Wrigley’s dimensions and foul territory, this isn’t exactly an insurmountable obstacle. It is, however, something to watch.

Compensation

This is Fowler’s last arbitration year. He filed $10.5 million, and the Astros countered at $8.5. That’s a lowball, and they’ll meet in the middle + a little sweetener. I’d wager $9.75 or $10 million gets it done.

Arbitration schedules go 40/60/80, so an offer of $10 million means his free agent value is around $12.5 million. That’s fair; unfortunately, that would only really make sense if he could stay healthy for 160 games. He can’t; he misses 30 games or so a year. Still, if he stays healthy and just steps forward a little bit, he could be an interesting QO test case. You’d think he’d accept it… at least I would. However, if he has a wRC+ in the middle 120 range, he might be able to get something like 5/65, and if that’s the case, maybe he takes that and give the Cubs a comp pick.

I’d be remiss as a writer if I didn’t mention that Fowler is pretty attractive as a flippable asset. If they traded him at the deadline, he’d only cost about $4.5 million to whatever team picked him up. A cheap, effective outfielder that has no future associated contract? That could be pretty valuable, depending on how the market shakes out. Hopefully, this isn’t a scenario that shakes out. However, it seems definitely possible.

Summary

The Cubs acquired Fowler by dealing from an area of surplus (Luis Valbuena and Dan Straily). They received a short-term stopgap at OF that makes them slightly more competitive today than they were last week. Neither Valbuena nor Straily figured to be an important piece beyond 2015 in any case. These all sound like good things, and they are. I’m a fan of this trade.

Better Know a Cub: Ryan Kalish

Theo Epstein knows Ryan Kalish as well as any GM in the minors. Kalish was drafted by the wonderkid in the 9th round of the 2006 draft; one pick before Mark Melancon.

Quick Aside: Look at the 2006 Red Sox draft. It's pretty great. Epstein drafted Justin Masterson, Daniel Bard, Josh Reddick, Brandon Belt (who didn't sign), and Matt LaPorta (who didn't sign). All of those players were at one point Top 50 prospects, and NONE of them were drafted in the first round. Not a ton of impact in this draft, but Epstein can find talent in late rounds.

Kalish was a HS OF/SP/QB/SS/P, so you'd imagine that he'd have some growing pains. Not so; as a 19 year old in the NYPL (A- ball), Kalish hit .368/.471/.540. That was enough to get him on the BA Top 100 (albeit a thanks-for-playing #98 spot). Unfortunately for Kalish, this was the year he also had the Albert Almora hamate bone special surgery. In 2008, he backslid a bit in his promotion to full-season work, though he made it to A+ Lancaster for a dozen games or so. 2009 saw him climb the ladder where he spent the majority of the time in AA, and at 22 Kalish busted into the big leagues; hitting .252/.305/.405 in 53 games. That was pretty impressive, but the 2011 Red Sox had Crawford/Ellsbury/Drew in left, center, and right, respectively. Kalish at this point was considered a pretty decent prospect, but not the caliber prospect as Josh Reddick, who was the 4th OF, so Kalish went to AAA as the outfielder-in-waiting in 2011. Things went quite badly. Things didn't really improve for Kalish in 2012, either; he logges some time with the big league club, but hit .229/.272/.260 there, and was .261/.336/.414 in AAA to boot. That option to Pawtucket came to promote Ryan Sweeney to the club, which is kind of interesting.

2013 was the worst year of Kalish's professional career. He underwent arthroscopic surgery to repair a labrum tear in his right shoulder. That was in January; he'd miss the whole season to this surgery. At this point, Kalish considered retiring. In August, he had ANOTHER surgery, this time cervical fusion surgery. This is identical to the surgery that Peyton Manning had, and capped off another terrible season for him (his 3rd in a row).

Kalish was released by the Sox in December of 2013, and the Cubs picked him up as one of seemingly half-a-dozen 5th OF candidates. Apparently, he's impressed Theo Epstein enough to consider trading Schierholtz away to accommodate him.

Offense

Speed was a sizable part of Kalish's game in the past. He was considered fast enough on the basepaths to steal his fair share of bases, though in the same vein of Albert Almora. Kalish gets anywhere from a 45 to a 55 on his speed, which has diminished slightly as Kalish has filled out. With the increased size has come the body for 12-15 HR; not exactly what you want to see from your RF, but an adequate total from a centerfielder (which Kalish might be able to pass for). Kalish has very good plate discipline, and the projection systems seem to think he'll walk around 8% of the time. He'll also whiff 22%, though. There's an apocryphal story that Kalish didn't swing and miss at a pitch in high school his senior year, but that's not very believable.

We don't have much data on his splits, but it doesn't appear like he was a meaningful platoon split to worry about (Kalish is left-handed). The Lilliputian data we have on Brooks Baseball does tell us, however, that Kalish is a dead-red fastball hitter. He has a .294 average on the hard stuff, and a .181 average on everything else. There just isn't enough data to parse anything too meaningful as to where Kalish's weaknesses are, but it's worth noting that pitchers almost exclusively pitch Kalish away, and they've put him away the same way they put away any left-handed batter with 2 strikes – low and inside.

Defense

Kalish is a solid defender, someone who has always been regarded as a natural baseball player. He's a bit of a tweener now – his arm is fringe-average, and isn't an asset in right, and his speed is average, and isn't an asset in center. He won't embarass himself at either position, but I'd be surprised if he was better than average at center and just slightly above it in right. Kalish had been playing a lot of right field this spring, which is slightly concerning to me. I'm not sure Kalish can cut it offensively to be all that valuable.

Summary

The projection systems give Kalish a line of around .245/.310/.380. That seems fair, and it seems pretty bad for a rightfielder of questionable health. Still, Kalish is an Epstein acolyte, and he looks to get every chance in the world to succeed. It's not the most inconceivable thing in the world to imagine Kalish becoming an average RF, but that seems to be his ceiling. His floor is either perpetually injured (cervical fusion surgery is a hell of a thing) or the lack of development/reps from ages 23-25 will be too much for Kalish to handle. If Kalish can stay healthy, he seems to be a reasonable choice for a 4th or 5th OF, but not much more.

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Better Know a Cub: Jason Hammel

After the Cubs missed on Masahiro "We think he's a No. 3 Starter – Cashman" Tanaka, the Cubs went to a fall back plan. They signed Jason Hammel to a 1-year, $6 million dollar deal. Hammel, who has been good at times and bad most others, is a classic pump-and-dump candidate a la Feldman/Baker/numerous others. Do you remember the Scott Hairston era? Me neither. In any case, Hammel comes to Chicago after an awful 2013 (ERA 4.97, but he was unlucky; his FIP was only 4.96). Will he rebound in the Windy City?

Pedigree

Jason Hammel was drafted by the Devil Rays in the 10th round of the 2002 draft. He was drafted by the Devil Rays in 2001 as well (in the 19th round), and they continued to like him. He started his professional career in Rk/A- ball, and he was underwhelming then. He wasn't really anything special until 2004, where he pitched the lights out in Bakersfield at A+ ball (1.89 ERA in 71.1 innings). After a strong showing in 2005 that culminated in 10 starts at AAA Durham, Hammel was named the #79 prospect by Baseball America:

…Hammel's lively fastball sits in the 91-94 mph range and gets on hitters quickly thanks to his tremendous extension. He also throws a hard curveball in the 75-79 mph range, and he has shown considerable improvement with his changeup. He has the best command in the system. Hammel's curveball is inconsistent. While his fastball has good life down in the zone, it straightens out when he leaves it up … He should be a significant building block as a middle-of-the-rotation starter in the Rays' building project.

Hammel was called up for 9 starts in 2006 and they were awful. He had a 7.77 ERA and a 1.864 WHIP. In 2007, he split time between starting in Durham and starting/relieving in Tampa Bay. The results at the major league level weren't much better. In 2008, his last year with the Rays org, he relieved almost exclusively and was just about league-average. He was traded to Colorado for Aneury Rodriguez where he was a league-average starter, and afterwards was then traded to Baltimore for Jeremy Guthrie. His first year in Baltimore was a huge success: he started only 20 games, but in those 118 innings he had a 3.43 ERA, good for an ERA+ of 123. It was predicated on a substantial gain on his strikeout percentage (22.9%, by far his greatest number). Hammel suffered an elbow injury (inflammation) in 2013 which is maybe partially to blame for his bad season; the fact remains that his strikeouts fell 7.2% and his LD% increased 3.3%. That's a recipe for disaster. Hammel made $6.75 million last year (his last of arbitration). He had to settle for a $6 million prove-it deal this offseason, in a fairly mediocre class of pitching.

Pitch Selection

Pitch (2013)	velo	% lefties	%righties	h-break	v-break
4FB	93.0	34.2	34.3	-3.9	9.6
SIN	92.7	28.2	23.8	-7.2	7.5
CRV	86.1	12.6	7.2	-7.3	5.2
SLD	84.7	13.0	32.3	3.9	-1.1
CH	77.2	12.2	2.4	7.4	-7.4

Number c/o Brooks Baseball

Hammel throws as hard as he did when he entered the league, but his release point keeps getting higher and higher. While he uses his changeup against lefties much more often than he does against righties, they still crush the pitch when they hit it (that's common among off-speed offerings). The slider is more of a traditional 3 to 9 offering and very effective against same-side batters (Hammel is right-handed).

Stuff

Hammel can throw in the low-90s, but he isn't going to overpower you. Instead, Hammel will try to induce weak contact. When Jason is his most effective, he is a ground-ball pitcher (53.2% in 2012, by far his best year and GB rate). He'll strike out around 16.6% of his batters and walk about 7.9%. That's a little worse than average in walks and a good deal worse in average in K% (7.4% and 18.9%, respectively).

Summary

The best thing I can say for Hammel is that he's moving from the AL East to the NL Central. We have at least an idea how that exchange will go (it was worth 20 points of FIP and 81 points of ERA to Feldman, who coincidentally made the exact reverse transition). Hammel had a putrid year last year and elbow issues mean that it could just be who he is now. That being said, 2012 wasn't that long ago, and you only need a guy like Jason to put together 100 solid innings before you turn him over for the next Jake Arrieta or Pedro Strop. Given the paucity of proven talent at the backend of the Cubs' rotation, Hammel will get every chance to realize that value. I have to openly wonder if the upside is really there, though. In my opinion, I'd much rather give that half-season of starts to someone who has a future with the Cubs (Justin Grimm or Kyle Hendricks). We'll wait and see.

Better Know a Cub: Jose Veras

As GW astutely pointed out, the 2014 Cubs are headhunting directly from the 2013 Astros bullpen. On the surface, that sounds terrible. In practice, the Cubs have poached the only two good members of that pen, for a collective $5 million and change. $4 million of that this year will go to Jose Veras, the "closer" of the Astros last season (one openly wonders if having 51 save opportunities all year actually makes one a "closer"). If the market rate for a win is $6 million, than we'd hope Veras provides around .7 wins above replacement in the coming year. Is that feasible?

Pedigree

Jose Enger Veras was signed by the Devil Rays as an AFA in 1998 (Veras was 18 at the time). After spending '98 and '99 in various Rookie leagues (Gulf Coast and Appalchian), Jose saw his first full-season work in Charleston of the Sally League. He struggled has a starter all the way until 2004; he then took to a reliever's role for Texas in 2005 (he was a 6-year minor league FA after the 2004 season. At 25, Veras saw his first cup of coffee with the Yankees (he closed for AAA Columbus that year); he was serviceable in 11 innings for the big club. He bounced up and down between AAA and MLB until he was finally bought by the Indians…who promptly cut him loose after the 2009 season. He would yo-yo one last season, with the Marlins, in 2010, before staying in the Majors for good. Veras spent 2011-2013 as a high-K, high-BB flamethrower, usually in the 7th or 8th but closing for Houston until a midseason trade sent him to Detroit.

Pitch Selection

Veras has 3 pitches. He leans on his 4-seam fastball, which he threw 53% of the time last year. It's slowing down, going from 96.0 in 2007 to 94.1 in 2013 (itself a loss of .3 MPH from last year). It breaks equally hard down and in on the hands of righties and has become a real weapon against righties in the past few years. Against righties, he'll also throw a curve to keep hitters off the heat. The curve averages 77.5 mph (again, down from a peak of 80.1). It's a really slurvy curve, diving well away from righties. You can just imagine Alfonso Soriano striking out to this pitch. In fact, let's call it a slurveball, because that's what it is. Against lefties only, Veras will also flash a changeup. It's actually a nifty pitch, and it works perfectly off the fastball (same horizontal break, a little more dip). It's the out pitch against lefties and it does the job.

Stuff

Veras has the arsenal to get lots of swings and misses. He has a career 23.9% strikeout percentage. That's really nifty; unfortunately, the attached 12.0% walk rate is an extreme liability. The resultant 12% outlay of K%-BB% is the league average, which makes Veras essentially a league-average pitcher. Lo and behold, his FIP- is 99. To Veras' credit, he keeps the ball in the park and strands above his fair share, which gives him a hand up. Crazily enough, Veras has a career BABIP of .266. That is extremely lucky, and honestly I don't know what to make of it. Good…job?

Summary

Jose Veras was signed to presumably battle it out with Pedro Strop for the closer's job next year. Normally, I'd say I trust that Theo won't let the payrolls make a difference, but who am I kidding. The Cubs acquired Veras to pump and dump. He yielded Danry Vazquez and David Paulino last year, a formidable return if you're high on Vazquez (and you could make a case for him). Given that Veras is 4 MM this year with a 5.5 MM option (essentially), he could potentially yield a good deal more. If the Cubs are sneakily competitive (and a Tanaka/Choo signing can make that happen), he's definitely in the mix to close games legitimately as well. All told, this isn't a move that has a lot of risk or upside, and those are the kind of moves that this FO has been keen on making for 3 years running.

Better Know A Cub: George Kottaras

George Kottaras and Theo Epstein have a history. Acquired in 2006 for 5 starts of David Wells, Kottaras spent the first few years of his career as a top catching prospect, with great patience, moderate pop, and the ability to play passable defense. As time took hold of George, he lost most of those talents, and all of his star power with them. What's left is a guy who walks and strikes out with high frequency and does little else. Is that enough to warrant a spot on the 25-man roster?

Offense

There are one and a half interesting wrinkles to George's game. The half is his underrated power. The league average ISO for a catcher last year was .143 (oddly enough, that is also the league rate in general). Last year, Kottaras had an ISO of .190, and his career rate is .192. When Kottaras hits the ball, it's generally a long way. The interesting part of his profile, though, is how little he actually does make contact. Kottaras struck out 33.3% of PA last season, and walked 19.0% of the time. That's correct: he didn't make contact 66 times last season, and made contact 60 times (and 5 of those were HR). That's a TTO that would make Adam Dunn blush. On his career (only 820 ML PA), he's the owner of a 13.5% walk rate and a 26.0% strikeout rate. He also averages 24.8 HR per 700 PA. Add it all up, and you might wonder why a guy with a .324 career OBP (and .351/.349 numbers his last two seasons) hasn't had an opportunity to start.

The answer is his batting average. Last season, it was .180. The career slash for the Greek is .214/.324/.406. Honestly, I don't care at all what his batting average is, but it's hard for a manager to see a guy that doesn't get a hit most days he plays (he had a hit in only 18 of his 46 games last year, and never more than one) and want to pencil him in every day. It's perhaps a backwards way of thinking, but it's still there. He also has catcher speed, so his walks mean slightly less than they might with someone who could take 3rd on more singles and so forth. Even with Kottaras' power and OBP skill, he slots firmly at the bottom of a lineup, where there aren't many chances for him to actually come around to score (but that's not exactly his fault).

The plan is almost certainly to start Kottaras against the tougher righties; his career slash against RH starters is .228/.334/.431 compared to a .154/.284/.300 clip on lefties starters. On the other hand, Welington's numbers against righties are essentially identical, so it might just make sense to slot Kottaras in every third day, taking care to avoid lefties, and not worry about "exposing" Castillo against righties.

Defense

This is what doesn't make sense to me. Looking at FanGraphs, Kottaras grades pretty highly defensively. He's been consistently worth over a win with the glove. However, if you look at George's CS rates, they are among the worst for the position over the past half a decade. I could steal reliably on George Kottaras. In fact, he is 33% worse than the league average goalie. That's likely a primary driver for Kottaras' consistenly poor FRAA on baseball prospectus. Without having seen him personally, I can't attest to his framing skills or how he calls a game, but the general consensus I've felt is that he's pretty well thought-of with respect to calling a game.

Summary

When you combine a poor batting average with an a noodle at backstop, you can make the case that Kottaras should linger in AAA all season. When you combine a 13.5% BB with a .192 ISO, you start to wonder why George doesn't start. Put it all together, and you have the platonic ideal of a backup; someone who is opposite-handed of your starter (Castillo is a righty), who has tools you can play up and serious deficiencies that prevent him from otherwise starting, and a guy who isn't likely to make much more than $1.4 million. I fully expect Kottaras to break camp as the No. 2 C, and play there acceptably all year.

Better Know a Cub: Matt Guerrier

Matt Guerrier is a few people's favorite Cub. "How could this be possible?", you may ask. Well, his presence on the team means Carlos Marmol's presence isn't. That's a win for many people who just wanted Marmol and his $9.8 million contract out of Chicago. Honestly, I don't really mind if players are overpaid (I care only from the abstract payroll sense, and Marmol's contract has never been the difference between the Cubs being competitive or not), but I can't deny there was a stigma surround him. However he's not on the 40-man roster. Matt Guerrier is.

Pedigree

Matt Guerrier was drafted in 1999 by the White Sox. He was a 10th round selection of out Kent State University. He started as a reliever, but found some success in 2001 as a starter for AA-AAA. He was traded to the Pirates in 2002 for Damaso Marte and Edwin Yan, and he did not do well there in AAA. He had an ERA of 4.59 and 4.53, respectively, and was waived where he was claimed by the Minnesota Twins. He did better as a starter there in 2004, with a 3.19 ERA as 25-year old. He had a cup of coffee in their bullpen; after that, he broke with the camp for (essentially) good. He was a very good reliever from 2005 to 2010, but has sputtered since signing a 3 yr/$12 million contract with LA (1.5/4.75/4.75).

Pitch Selection

It's hard to get a handle on Guerrier's pitch selection. Pitch F/X freaks out and claims Guerrier dropped his slider in 2011 (which he used 40% of the time) for a cutter…but they are essentially the same pitch, thrown 83-90 with some y break and little x break. It doesn't move very much for a typical slider/cutter, but he also throws it to contact more often than the average guy. He throws a fastball 45% or so, and it moves around 90 mph (touches 93). Funnily enough, it's his better pitch the past two years, and his "out" pitch, as it were. It does a decent job of handcuffing righties. He also offers a curve that comes in at 78 and runs 10 to 4; it'd be a real weapon as a change of plane pitch if he had any handle on it, but he doesn't.

Stuff

It should really be more like "Stuff." Guerrier doesn't have any; he has a 6 K/9 percentage, which is bad. 15.9 K%, 7.8 BB% just aren't great numbers. It's added up to a 4.34 FIP (which he's generally always beaten: career ERA is 3.53). "Luckily" for Matt, his BABIP for his career is .266. Since he puts so many balls in play, he's going to be overly dependent on defenses to bail him out (and the Dodgers had a shit defense that buried him this year). Guerrier isn't a flyball or groundball pitcher, either, he's just a pitch-to-contact guy. That's not a great skillset in a reliever.

Summary

Matt Guerrier is basically a janitor at this point in his career. He's not a guy that you can call on to throw flames and get a strikeout, and he isn't a starter (and doesn't have a 3rd offering to ever be one). He's 34, so his best days are behind him. He's not even really a ROOGY (.319 to .290, wOBA-wise). Guerrier is a fungible reliever that can eat up innings and not be all that bad. He's not worth the 4.75 million he's paid, but he's probably worth the little we saved by shipping Marmol to LA.

Better Know a Cub: Pedro Strop

Pedro Strop was part of the trade that sent Scott Feldman over to the Orioles. While the "big prize" in that trade was considered to be Jake Arrieta, there's a great chance that Strop is going to provide more value going forward. He had a rought beginning to 2013 before he was traded to the Cubs. What's Strop likely to be?

Pedigree

Strop was signed by the Colorado Rockies as an amateur free agent all the way back in 2002. He was 17 at the time, and toiled in the DSL all the way until 2006, as a 21. Bred as a reliever, Strop made his way to AA as a 23 year old (in 2009) and ended up to Texas. Baltimore claimed him in 2011 after Texas dropped him on waivers, and he more-or-less instantly became nails, posting a 0.73 ERA in his small sample size in '11 (12.1 innings), and was incredible in 2012 (66.1 innings, 2.44 ERA). The great 2012 season masked an average FIP of 3.59, and in 2013 luck reversed course and slammed him with a 5.40 ERA off of a 4.41 FIP to this point (and 7.25 ERA and a 5.51 FIP with the Orioles). He was thrown in the Arrieta/Feldman trade, and ever since he's been filthy.

Pitch Selection

Strop has 2 pitches, with a 13 mph difference or so between them. He throws a fastball around 60% of the time, and it's fast. In 2013, his average velocity is 95.6 this season, and that's typical of Strop throughout his career. His success with the fastball came in 2012, when he finally started to get some run on it (it was very straight early on), but it's a flat fastball which leaves him prone to more than his fair share of line drives. He throws a slider 30% of the time, and it's really pretty effective as a change-of-pace pitch. It goes around 82 mph and has started to run in on lefties fairly well. Unfortunately, it's a Marmol-variety of slider that doesn't spend much time actually in the strike zone. He baits batters fairly well, and they aren't going to make contact, but he's got the chance to walk 3 straight batters every time he comes out. The other 10% are a split between a different fastball and a changeup which he rarely throws. His changeup is terrible and has been for years.

Stuff

Strop has always been a TTO guy. In his career, his K rate is 22.1%, his BB rate is 13.1%, and his HR rate is 2.2%. While his ERA has always been wildly different, his SIERA hasn't; it's mid-3s every year. His BABIP hovers around .270 – .280 in the past 3 years, which makes sense to me given the movement and velocity of his pitches, but his strand rate was awful with the Orioles last year (61.1%) and insane with the Cubs (100.0%). He's been hit-lucky in Chicago so far, as well, but he's also had a 1.22 FIP. I don't expect his K and BB rates to stay at 37.0% and 7.4%, but he should settle in nicely as the years pass.

Summary

The lack of a true 3rd pitch means that Strop only has value as a reliever, maybe as a closer or fireman potentially. He's 28, so he's not old or young, but the Cubs have team control until 2018, when he'll be 33. Strop's ceiling is as a closer (that probably walks too many to be dominant), but when his fastball loses a few miles or if his control slips even further he'll be out of baseball. I think he's got a chance a to be a cheap 7th inning or setup man as the most likely scenario, and that's a fine return for Scott Feldman all on it's own (a guy anyone could have signed for a reasonable amount this offseason). Perhaps it's not the sexiest get for a pitcher at the trade deadline, but Cubs fans should definitely remember the pain of a poor bullpen.

Is Travis Wood “outstanding?”

On Bleacher Nation, Brett had some very kind words to say about Travis Wood:

"I’m not sure I’d say he’s even the best starter on the Cubs at this point, but Wood’s ridiculous start to the year can’t be ignored. And, as I pointed out previously in the Bullets, it isn’t just the start of this season: Wood has been outstanding since he began his tenure with the Cubs."

and he follows it up with the necessary caveat:

"In fairness, any conversation of how good Travis Wood has been this year needs to include a conversation of what the advanced stats say. In short, they say he’s been far more lucky than good. A .198 BABIP against and an 80.7% LOB make him the polar opposite of Edwin Jackson, which is to say fortune may be smiling on Wood (his xFIP is just 4.19, even though his ERA is 2.33). In total, I believe Wood remains a very nice 3/4/5 type, and probably more of a 4/5 on a good team. Best starter in baseball? Nah. But that’s not an insult."

I'm not trying to misinterpret Mr. Taylor; he knows that Travis Wood is not dominance given flesh. The assumption that Travis has been anything more than average, though, is really interesting to me. I can't remember ever thinking "man, I'm glad we've got Travis Wood on our team" last year, and he's been tremendously lucky this year. Still, it bears looking at. How good has Travis Wood been this year (and for the Cubs)?

First, let's look at his regular stats. As a Cub, has pitched 202.1 innings for the Cubs in 33 starts, so basically exactly a full season. In that season, he's allowed 86 earned runs (93 total) off of 29 HR, and he's struck out 153 while walking 68. That's good for a 3.83 ERA and a 1.137 WHIP. Those numbers are good for a 106 ERA+, which is indicative of a slightly above-average pitcher (and his 2012 ERA+ was 96).

Last year, his ERA was 4.27; however, his FIP was 4.84 and his xFIP was 4.62. His tERA (which is derived from batted ball rates) was 5.58, primarily due to his huge HR number (an inordinate amount of flyballs from Travis were home runs last year). Essentially all advanced stats had Wood as a below-average to well below-average player last year.

What's changed from 2012 to 2013? For starters, his line drives allowed have been much less; they've all become groundballs. I'm not sure how sustainable a 5% drop in LD and an associated 6% increase in GB is, but I'm willing to believe it's extremely unlikely. I will say that Bosio has done some sort of magic to increase the GB rate across the board on our team. Suffice to say, the more GB (as opposed to LD), the better.

Wood has also been "luckier" in his HR/FB rate. Last year, it was 12.7%, which is atypical for him. In the previous years, it was around 6.5%, and it's returned somewhat to normalcy. These two changes have brought his tERA to 3.62 from 5.58, which is more in line with an average pitcher.

It's hard to understate how lucky Wood has been this year, though. The average strand rate in baseball this year is 73.3%; Wood's is 80.7%. That's 28th in the league right now. His BABIP of .198 is 5th. BABIP normalizes around .280-.320 for pitchers (who can control it, perhaps, but only minutely) so that's going to go up.

Something else to note is that Wood's opponent's contact rate is way, way down this year. Normally, it's right at 84.5%. This year, it's 81.5%. That doesn't seem like a big deal, but is. The swing rate in baseball is around 45%. That means that opponents will swing, on average, at about 45-50 offerings Wood throws each game. The difference of 3% in contact on those is an extra swing-and-miss or two a game. Depending on where those misses come, that could mean either a strikeout or just a worse count for your opponent (keeping in mind that a swing and miss isn't a foul ball and thus always changes the game state). If Wood keeps that up, it's a huge bonus; one of Wood's biggest obstacles is the fact that opponents have always made contact against him (the league average hovers around 77%, so this gain is not incredibly difficult to continue realizing).

So, we've established that batters are hitting grounders more, have a lower BABIP (which is some indication of poor contact), and missing bats more often (all great things). Why can this be this year?

It's probably explainable with the pitches he's throwing. Wood has been using his cutter more often than in previous years. This is a good thing, because it's also moving a bit more (over 2 inches of vertical movement extra). Thus far, that's yielded a higher number of ground balls and a lower number of line drives.

The tale is similar with his normal fastball. It's dropping 11.2 inches now as opposed to 9.8 on average and 8.8 last year. A fairly flat fastball (which he had last year) going to a fairly active fastball (which he has this year) is going to do wonders to a player's confidence. Curiously enough, he's still had bad luck with the long ball in his fastball offerings; however, he's cut his walks with the pitch in half (possibly an artifact of not throwing it later in counts), maintaing a lower BABIP (and his slash line with the fastball is .190/.244/.381), and inducing a TON more grounders (39.3%, 28.4% career average). All told, his fastball has gone from a mediocre pitch to an average to above-average one.

I'd expect that as long as Wood has the extra downward movement on his two primary offerings, he's going to have some success going forward. Pitchers that can induce groundballs are going to have some success barring really bad pitch placement or bad luck. As Wood's balls starting falling in for hits, his numbers are going to look quite a bit worse. I'd imagine he'll settle into the 3.50-3.75 range when it's all said and done (EDIT: at the end of the year, he'll be in the 3.50 to 3.75 range, if I'm not clear), but with a distinct possibility of a low-3 average should he maintain his newfound movement and swing/miss action. His K% and BB% are essentially identical to his career numbers, so the gains are going to have to come this way. Travis Wood might not be "outstanding," but he has been genuinely good.

Better Know a Cub: Nate Schierholtz

When Nate Schierholtz signed with the Cubs, he was coming off of two pretty identical seasons:

				G	PA	AB					HR						AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS	OPS+
2011	27	SFG	NL	115	362	335	42	93	22	1	9	41	7	4	21	61	.278	.326	.430	.756	114	144	5	4	0	2	3
2012	28	TOT	NL	114	269	241	20	62	8	5	6	21	3	2	23	46	.257	.321	.407	.728	104	98	1	1	1	3	2

That was good enough to garner a 1-year, 2.25 million dollar contract. In 2012, he was strictly used as the dominant half of a platoon and it showed: Nate had an .826 OPS against righties but a putrid .444 against lefthanders. It's important to note that he only received 269 PA, though. His split in 2011 was similarly severe: he hit .801 against righthanders and .562 against southpaws (again, OPS). What's interesting about that harsh split is that it's a recent development, though. His career numbers are .739/.703, so the past two years have basically made the entirety of the difference.

When the Cubs signed him, they made sure to go out and get someone to hit lefties to platoon with him (Scott Hairston). This season, the goal with Nate is clear: start him against righties whenever possible, and spin him into long-term assets at the trade deadline (The Giants traded Schierholtz + at the deadline for Hunter Pence last year). We'll see whether or not that ends up happening, but the plan itself is sound.

Offense

As noted, Schierholtz has a harsh platoon in recent years. The last time he hit a HR of a lefthander was in 2009 (when he actually had a reverse platoon split). Generally speaking, though, Schierholtz is going to provide a .260/.320/.420 line from RF. That's the equivalent, funny enough, of a Hunter Pence or Will Venable. These aren't guys we would consider all-stars at RF, or even average; I'd agree with that consensus. Schierholtz, even when platooned correctly, just isn't an offensive force. His career ISO is .141; David DeJesus' last year was .140. He doesn't draw a considerable amount of walks; his 6.2% mark is firmly well below the MLB average of 8.5%.

Schierholtz makes contact at a rate higher than the average MLB player, but he also swings more often. This would normally have the unfortunate effect of abbreviating his P/PA; however, he fouls off a much greater percentage of balls than the average player (32% to 27%). This helps drive up P/PA: his last 3 full seasons have had marks of 3.87, 3.97, and 4.00, all higher than the MLB average of 3.81. Nate has a tendency to chase pitches out of the zone, but also swings at pitches inside the zone with a pretty great frequency (the average is around 62%; his average is around 70%). All of these things point to a guy who is likely not walking a lot or striking out a lot. This means, of course, that BABIP is the supreme arbiter of the quality of his seasons. He's looked good this year, but his BABIP has been .353.

Schierholtz enjoys hitting changeups and cut fastballs and that's about it. Pitchf/x rates him as essentially average or worse against every other pitch save the knuckler.

Defense

From most accounts, Nate is a good defensive right fielder. Fans rate him as having a strong, accurate arm, and he has shown a high UZR/150 in right over his career. Unfortunately, it doesn't look like he could play CF. he was tried there for a week or so last year and rated poorly (and I remember him not having the instincts or spped for it). Even if Nate is a strong defensive RF, it doesn't provide much in the sense of surplus value, due to both the relative unimportance of defense at the position and the fact there is very little room in RF for any venturing outfielder to make plays. For what it's worth, Schierholtz has an essentially average range factor at RF; this is the primary driver of his miniscule (but not negative) defensive value.

Summary

Nate Schierholtz was brought in by Hoyer to do one thing; hit right-handed pitching. There's no reason he shouldn't be able to do that with a passable level of success. If he can do that, he can be valuable. A $2.25 million dollar contract isn't a hindrance to any team, and to be a success he'd have to provide maybe a single WAR. He's already been worth 0.4 this season, the same mark as his output last season. Schierholtz stands to get 400 or so PA on the Cubs this year and I'd expect him to have a wOBA of .330 or so. That's a valuable piece at the trade deadline; maybe not as a primary offensive upgrade, but as a very serviceable injury replacement. All told, this is a low-risk, medium-reward move that a good GM should be proud to make.