Better Know a Cub – Page 3

Better Know a Cub: Brett Jackson

How long does it take to change your swing? Is it even possible to change in your 20's? The answer to these 2 questions will probably tell you all you need to know about Jackson's future with the Cubs.

Brett Jackson was drafted in the 1st round of the 2009 draft, at 31st overall. He worked his way up many prospect lists in the ensuing few years, putting up .400 wOBAs essentially in every year in the minors. Jackson displayed great plate discipline every year (he walked from 10 to 16% each season) and blossoming power (8/12/20 HR), and maintained a slugging percentage of around .490 every year.

The only problem with his game was his strikeouts, which hovered around 25% a year. The year he finally got called up, he had been striking out roughly 1/3 of the time, and he wasn't exactly tearing up the minors, either. In the majors, his strikeouts ballooned to a comical 41.5%. That's not a sustainable approach to the plate. Jackson is going to have to evolve as a hitter, most likely, to stick as an everyday player.

Offense

I've already outlined Jackson's basically stellar minor league numbers, but I'll give another quick rundown. He climbed a level in every season, and finished his AAA career at a .269/.353/.502 line. In AAA, he walked 12% of the time and struck out around 31%. I've never seen him in person (in the minors), but his admittedly small sample of major professional baseball gives us some additional insights.

First, he struck out 59 times in 142 plate appearances, "good" for 41.5% of the time. Using a sample size calculator, that 41.5% mark is anywhere from 30.8 to 52.2 as a "true" rate of strikeouts (99% certainty). Even at the extreme low end, that's a really high mark for someone of Jackson's skillset (only 14 players last year had a rate of 30% or higher, min. 250 PA).

That being said, it's relatively easy to diagnose Jackson's issues. He swings at the right pitches: he only offers at 23.9% of pitches outside the zone (league average: 29%). He swings at roughly the same percentage of in-zone pitches; however, he doesn't make contact with many of either. The league contact average is 79.7%. His contact percentage of 64.2 is the third lowest among players with 100 PA or more last year. There are two ways to be successful with a contact percentage that low: be Josh Hamilton and swing at 59% of the pitches with prodigious power, or only offer at pitches in the zone with a great amount of power. Jackson doesn't have the power to get pitchers to respect him, so he'll have to learn to make better contact. If he just became merely bad at it, his profile would rise from 4th OF to pretty good CF quickly. Hopefully his new swing helps out with that.

Defense

Jackson has always profiled as an above-average CF. He doesn't have great footspeed, but he does have good speed and he makes great jumps on the ball. He has just an average arm but throws with accuracy and will make most baserunners respect his ability to get the ball in.

Summary

I'm going to put two players side by side.

	o-swing%	z-swing%	swing%	o-contact%	z-contact %	contact%
Jackson	26%	65%	41%	49%	74%	64%
Dunn	24%	64%	41%	50%	80%	70%

As you can see, contact in the zone (and the lack of power) is what separates Jackson from successful high-K major leaguers. Every other part of Jackson's game is major-league ready, and that includes his plate discipline. For all of Jackson's problems, he still got on base at a higher clip than Darwin Barney last year, with a wOBA greater than one Luis Valbuena. I remain very, very skeptical of the ability to retool a swing in one off-season, but if Jackson can do it (or just find some more success with his old one), he's got the ability to be a productive major-league CF for a decade to come.

Better Know a Cub: Jorge Soler

Last year was the final time that the Cubs could really flex their financial advantage on the IFA market. After missing on Yoenis Cespedes (who is incredible), the Cubs hit on two of the big-ticket Latin American players. The first was Gerardo Concepcion, who is pretty much a non-prospect at this point. The other is Jorge Soler, who looks like he could be a very good player. Soler signed a 9-year, 30 million dollar deal that will pay him through 2020 (though he can opt out and go to arbitration when that starts). The Cubs never pay him more than 4 million in a single year, and his last year years will be age 26, 27, and 28. That's what a nice IFA contract looks like.

Offense

Soler doesn't have a great batting stance, from what I've seen. He's sort of straight up, and his swing seems really hard on his lower back. That being said, he's got prototypical power from RF. He could hit 25-30 HR as long as his hit tool progresses like it should. He didn't strike out that much and walked well enough for the lower levels. His bat speed (it's great) should allow him to make decent contact, and hopefully he won't strike out a ton. Soler has pretty good speed so he should be able to maintain a higher-than-average BABIP and provide some value on the basepaths. He likes to steal bases (12/1 last year in 149 PA and 35 chances), so look for that to be a part of his game in the future as well.

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	Lev	Aff	G	PA	AB	R	H	2B	HR	RBI	SB	CS	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	TB	GDP	HBP	IBB
2012	20	2 Teams	2 Lgs	A-Rk	CHC	34	149	134	28	40	7	5	25	12	1	12	19	.299	.369	.463	.832	62	3	3	2
2012	20	Cubs	ARIZ	Rk	CHC	14	61	54	14	13	2	2	10	8	0	6	13	.241	.328	.389	.717	21	0	1	0
2012	20	Peoria	MIDW	A	CHC	20	88	80	14	27	5	3	15	4	1	6	6	.338	.398	.513	.910	41	3	2	2
1 Season						34	149	134	28	40	7	5	25	12	1	12	19	.299	.369	.463	.832	62	3	3	2

Defense

Some scouts say that Soler's arm is his best tool. He has a consensus cannon from RF, and the speed to play the position very well. Soler should be a plus defender in the big leagues; however, I wonder why he isn't tried out at CF (probably because he doesn't have plus speed). Scouts also say he has poor routes; I expect that to be fixed by the minor league coaching.

Summary

Soler is very, very raw. He didn't have much competition in Cuba, and the level of competition he faced is maybe comparable to Low-A. He's going to work through the minors as slowly as a normal high-school prospect. He'll need to learn how to hit good pitches, and he'll probably have to clean up his stance a little bit. On the plus side, he's got plenty of tools in the toolbox. He's got legit plus power and a plus arm. He's got more than enough speed to be a great RF and the bat speed to be competitive in the majors. There is significant risk to Jorge Soler, but the upside is huge.

Better Know a Cub: Christian Villanueva

Christian Villanueva was acquired by the Cubs for Ryan Dempster at the trade deadline in 2012. He wasn't the top prospect we all wanted (Randall Delgado), but I was fairly excited by the pickup. I almost always prefer positional prospects to pitchers; partly due to TINSTAAP, but mostly because successful position players are (on the whole) usually more beneficial to a team than pitchers. If we're getting a lottery ticket, I'll take the lottery position player almost every time.

A cursory glance of Villaneuva's minor league stats leaves a good amount to be desired. 20-year old prospects should clean up A-ball, and Villanueva only hit the league for a .278/.338/.465 line. He did show a good amount of power, though; 30 doubles and 17 home runs in 529 PA isn't at all shabby, and adding 32 SB (with 6 CS) he earned himself a fringe top-100 spot on Baseball America's list.

I don't think he did enough to stay on that list in 2012. Instead of moving to AA at some point in his age-21 season, Villanueva played A+ leagues exclusively (Carolina League to Florida League). He outplayed both leagues, but barely: the average line in the Carolina League (where he spent the majority of the year) is .257/.327/.390 (and the average age is 22.5); he hit .285/.356/.421. He only walked 34 times in 520 PA, though, which is pretty depressing.

Offense

I don't have access to advanced metrics, so I'm going to work off scouting reports mostly and what I can glisten from his stat sheet. Sickels praises his gap power (a claim evidenced by his high doubles total). Other reports I've seen say he has an average hit tool and about average power. He's got room to grow, though: a 5'11", 160 lb frame screams room to bulk up and put some hurt on the baseball.

From the youtube clips I've seen, he's got a pretty tight swing without a ton of excess motion. It almost looks like he's got a hitch to his swing, though. He's not the fastest player, either. One of the cheesecake scouting reports gushed about his speed, but looking at him, I don't see it.

Defense

The scouting reports are all pretty unanimous in praise of his 3B defense. There are even whispers of a toolkit that would enable him to play 2B (in which case he becomes a much, much better prospect). I don't care a ton about the errors at the lower levels. If Villaneuva can be even an average 2B, his bat makes him a pretty legitimate threat there. If he ends up being an above-average defensive 3B, he'll get by too.

Summary

Villanueva should start the season at AA. ~~That means either Cerda is moving up to AAA to play 3B behind Vitters~~ Cerda was taken in the Rule V draft (h/t to GW), so he's essentially got the job to himself unless Lake stays in AA (which would be a bad sign). If Villaneuva hits the Southern League like he hit the Florida League (I'm looking for a wOBA around .360 – .365), he'll be right on track. If not, he's got a pretty dim future. In the best case, Villanueva is agressively promoted to AAA when Vitters leaves and he gets 200-300 PA there. Christian is a player I'll be watching closely in 2013.

Better Know a Cub – Edwin Jackson

Edwin Jackson used to be the #4 prospect in baseball.

Getting his first taste of the bigs in 2003 (as a 19-year old, no less), Jackson had a huge reputation to live up to early on in his career. For a long, long time, he never lived up to it.

2004	20	LAD	NL	2	1	.667	7.30	8	5	1	0	0	24.2	31	20	20	7	11	1	16	0	0	0	113	57	1.703	11.3	2.6	4.0	5.8	1.45
2005	21	LAD	NL	2	2	.500	6.28	7	6	0	0	0	28.2	31	22	20	2	17	0	13	1	1	2	134	66	1.674	9.7	0.6	5.3	4.1	0.76
2006	22	TBD	AL	0	0		5.45	23	1	7	0	0	36.1	42	27	22	2	25	0	27	1	1	3	174	85	1.844	10.4	0.5	6.2	6.7	1.08
2007	23	TBD	AL	5	15	.250	5.76	32	31	0	1	1	161.0	195	116	103	19	88	3	128	4	1	7	755	79	1.758	10.9	1.1	4.9	7.2	1.45
2008	24	TBR	AL	14	11	.560	4.42	32	31	0	0	0	183.1	199	91	90	23	77	1	108	2	1	7	792	100	1.505	9.8	1.1	3.8	5.3	1.40

This is an auspicious start to a career, to be sure. It's important to keep in mind a few things, though:

a) 24.2, 28.2, and 36.1 are essentially meaningless sample sizes.

b) The average 22-year old pitching prospect is getting ready to finish AA.

The thing that really pops out to me is the hellacious WHIP, here. You can't pitch in the bigs with a whip over 1.4; it just isn't going to happen.

Jackson would be traded as a 22-year old, a 24-year old, a 25-year old, a 26-year old, and as a 27-year old TWICE. That's insanity.

As Jackson aged, he looked more and more like a journeyman 5th starter. It wasn't until 2010 until he really started to break through; I'll show you why I think that is.

Pitch Selection

Jackson has 3 primary offerings. His main pitch is a 93-94 mph fastball that he throws 60% of the time. As you'd expect from a guy with a primary-pitch fastball, it hovers around -.6 runs per 100, which is obviously below average but relatively fine for a pitch you're throwing in the worst counts. Edwin also throws an 86 mph slidepiece (30%) that has consistently been a plus pitch over his career. After that, Jackson throws an awful changeup at 86 mph; he also throws maybe 2 curveballs a game.

Stuff

Jackson's success of late has been almost entirely predicated on his ability to throw the first pitch for a strike. Until 2010, Jackson's average for F-Strike% was 54%; from 2010 onwards, it is 59%. You may think that's no huge difference; it is. The correlation between throwing your first pitch for a strike and throwing your last pitch for one is pretty high. Really, no peripheral of Jackson's has changed besides K/9 (a modest downturn in BB/9, also attributed to getting the first pitch over for a strike), as far a LD%, HR/FB%, LOB%, yet his performance has been a lot better.

I don't know enough about Jackson to hazard a guess as to why he's throwing more first pitch strikes, but whoever told him to should get a free meal from the Scott Boras.

Summary

Edwin signed a 4/52 contract with the Cubs. As dmick89 pointed out, the Cubs are paying right around the market price. It's important to realize that no every signing is going to be a steal. Teams with financial advantages need to use those advantages, and the Cubs just did. Even if the Cubs don't compete until 2015, they'll still need pitchers that season, and Jackson will be one (even if he's the #4 or #5 on a good team). He doesn't have a NTC, so we can get under the contract for prospects or relief if necessary, and he's as good a bet (for a pitcher) to earn his contract as anyone. Next year's FA class is dogshit, and they'll likely get worse. This is a good signing for a good pitcher.

Better Know a Cub: Alfonso Soriano

On November 19, 2006, Alfonso Soriano signed the 5th-largest contract in Major League History (to that point, by total dollars). Coming off a season in which the Fonz hit .277/.351/.560 and joined the 40/40 club, the deal looked like a pretty good sized overpay, but the cost of doing business with a premier free agent (and no mistake, averaging 36 homers and 41 doubles a year to that point in your career is valuable no matter how few walks you might draw). I'm not sure anyone thought he'd live up to that contract the day it was signed, but he'd be valuable nonetheless…

At first, the contract did not look all that terrible. In 2007, Soriano would have long dry-spells where he'd swing at pitches that hadn't even been thrown yet, or pick off attempts to first. Other weeks, though, he'd single-handedly win you 2 or 3 games. He was a boom or bust player, with just enough booms to live by.

Then, 2008 happened and everything (sort-of) changed.

Soriano lost another step to another injury. The hop that was endearing to some at first quickly became "how could you not catch that fly ball?" Soriano missed 53 games, and while his numbers were essentially unchanged, people started railing on the leftfielder. It didn't help that he now made 14 million, and was about to make 17.

2009 was, simply, a disaster. Soriano missed another 45 games and played the rest of the season hurt. His numbers plummeted to .241/.303/.423 off of a .279 BABIP. The times were rare that anyone did anything but boo Soriano.

After 2009, though, Soriano has quietly been pretty productive. Even his 2011 season (.244/.289/.469) wasn't a killer (if not exactly what you want from your LF). I can't begrudge anyone for signing the contract that's put in front of them; take the money out of it and Soriano has been a pretty good leftfielder for the past 6 years, with some definite bumps in the road.

Offense

Soriano is what you would call a "free swinger." He strikes out a lot, and doesn't walk a lot (premium analysis from the new guy). Most of his offensive value is derived from his huge ISO numbers: he was 6th in the league out of qualified leftfielders, and that was the primary driver of his .350 wOBA last year (good for 11th out of qualified LF). A 7.2% walk rate isn't pretty, but keep in mind the league average last year was only 8.0% and he still exceeded the league average in OBP last year (though it was essentially a tie).

To get a better idea of how much Soriano hates to leave the bat on his shoulder, consider the fact that he swung at 36.6% of pitches out of the zone last year, according to PITCH f/x. That was 7.6% more than the league average and 7.3% LESS than his percentage of pitches he swung at outside the zone last year. Predictably, he does not make contact with those pitches and never has; his contact rates are poor even looking at only pitches in the zone. Soriano averages 13.9% swinging strikes in his career; that's 7th most in baseball, along luminaries such as Delmon Young and Josh Hamilton.

As Soriano ages, his speed has regressed considerably, and that part of his game has essentially vanished, but an encouraging trend is his relatively static BABIP. As his speed regresses, you'd expect his BABIP to fall too; it hasn't, and that's most likely because Soriano isn't getting cheap hits (and never really was). As long as Soriano's power continues to hold up (and his HR/FB% rate was pretty high last year, something to look at), Soriano should keep most of his value.

Defense

Soriano's defense is the subject of a ton of debate. I can physically see why people hate Soriano's defense in left. He looks slow, and his stride has never been elegant even when he was very fast. He also does that weird hop thing from time to time. However, Soriano has a perfectly average arm at this point, and UZR has loved his outfield range forever (cue the UZR is bullshit chants). I'm not sure how dWAR is measured, but I also am pretty dubious that Darwin Barney is Brooks Robinson reincarnate so I'm inclined to think that it's a ways off in it's estimate of Soriano. I think the truth is that Soriano is a perfectly average defender and that Sveum (or whoever did defensive alignments in 2012) is a very good manager. That being said, seeing Soriano in 2 years in left is almost certainly going to remind me of Barry Bonds (without the offense, unfortunately).

Summary

Soriano has value to a lot of teams, including the Cubs. That contract that Hendry gave to him (and let's not forget that Soriano was a part of two divisional champions in the beginning of that contract) is a sunk cost; we can only recoup whatever we don't eat in a trade. If you forget about the contract and market Soriano as a 2/$10 guy, he has a good chunk or surplus value.

Please forward this article to the Phillies.

Better Know a Cub: Scott Feldman

The offseason following the 2012 has been relatively busy for the Cubs, almost of which has been trades and signings they didn’t make. One of the signings they did make, however, was bringing over Scott Feldman on a one-year, $6 million deal.

I don’t really get it.

Scott Feldman is a fair injury risk, missing a good chunk of time essentially every year of the past 6 (the only time he’s had over 165 organizational innings was 2009). Even when he’s healthy, he’s not that great. He sports a career 4.81 ERA gleaned from a 4.56 FIP, and the xFIP shows 4.52 as well. He was worth 2.3 fWAR (0.0 bWAR) last year, but still gave up over 5 runs per 9. In 2012, he was eminently replacement-level.

The Cubs are gambling on Feldman’s health and the changeover from AL West to NL Central. They are also looking for the upside in 32 innings of 2011 ball and 189.2 innings in 2009, which was 3 injuries away. This is a gamble they will likely lose.

Pitch Selection

Feldman is interesting in the sense that he abandoned his fastball in 2010. He doesn’t really throw one anymore, it’s more of a slider. He throws his slider around 35% of the time now, and it sits at 91 mph and frankly isn’t that good. It’s never rated as more than average according to PITCHf/x. Feldman also throws a 90 mph cutter (25%) and a 77 mph curve (25%), and both are average to middling offerings. Feldman will throw the occasional 86 mph change (10%) and 90 mph fastball (5%), but neither are effective or notable.

Stuff

Feldman has very average stuff. He works in the zone a little more than the average pitcher, and as a result batters tend to make a little more contact off of him. He doesn’t induce a lot of swinging strikes, but Feldman takes the tradeoff in the form of a very acceptable walk rate (2.33 per 9 last year). The increased contact also makes the typical Feldman plate appearance take more pitches than average; Feldman isn’t going to get very deep into starts.

Summary

The Feldman signing makes sense with respect to the need to have competent pitching at the back end of a roster. I‘m not sure it makes sense from the standpoint of creating a flippable asset, as I don’t think the market for #4 or #5 starters is going to be positively bare at the trade deadline. In any case, it’s only $6 million, and the Cubs can certainly afford it. I don’t think it’s a low-risk, high-reward situation; it’s more like low-risk, low-reward. Time will tell if Scott #2 proves me wrong.

Better Know a Cub: David DeJesus

David DeJesus is an interesting player. Although he’s never hit more than 13 home runs in a season, he’s always been a pretty useful player. He is not a prototypical RF because he has little power, but he’s not a prototypical leadoff guy because he has no speed. He’s a true #2 hitter; David will put the ball in play, move a guy over, and get on base.

DeJesus signed a 2 year, 8.5 million contract with a 2014 team option at 6.5 (1.5 buyout). The reason DeJesus was to be had so cheaply was the appearance of a dwindling skillset: his OBP crashed from .384 to .323 in just one season. That doesn’t tell the whole story, though; the primary driver of that descent was an abnormally high and then low BABIP (.355 in 2010, .274 in 2011). The Cubs were willing to take a gamble on the aberrant nature of DeJesus’ BABIP, and it paid off…kinda.

DeJesus got on base 35% of the time last year, which is a pretty good number and in line with the rest of his career numbers. Unfortunately, the power from 2010 has more or less eroded. A .403 SLG from RF is untenable unless you are a defensive mastermind, which DeJesus is not. For David to have more than just average value, he’ll have to recoup some power or get on base with a greater frequency; home runs might not happen but DeJesus has some gap power.

Offense

DeJesus’ primary value comes from his ability to extend plate appearances and get on base. He sports a career .355 OBP and 8.6% walk rate. That means that while he walks the same as a normal player, he consistently has a BABIP in the .315 range, making his batting average 15 points higher than the league average. If his BABIP were to fall to .300, he’d be essentially league average in every way (save lower power), but after 3305 AB we can be confident that .315 hovers around his true value.

DeJesus doesn’t strike out all that often; his career rate is 13.6%, 4% less than the league average. The fact that he maintains a low strikeout rate while going deep into at-bats is a huge, hidden bonus on offense and makes him the ideal #2 hitter in a line-up. He swings at less pitches than the average, and makes contact with pitches at a much, much higher rate than normal. That’s the trademark of a hitter that is not only intelligent, but consistent as well. DeJesus will likely be good for longer than is normal.

Defense

DeJesus plays best, by far, in left field. He doesn’t have a great arm in right, but for some reason he’s always had a good noodle in left, and is range is much improved there is well. He plays a passable centerfield as well, and in another era that’d be where is most useful; right now, there is a glut of talent at CF in the big leagues, so his positional flexibility isn’t as useful per se. He won’t kill you at any spot in the outfield, but as you go from left to right, as a rule he’s less and less useful to a club.

Summary

David DeJesus is a smart, consistent player. I’m a big fan of the guy, and could see him being a hitting coach in the future. His best days are probably behind him, though. His age-33 season is coming up, and he does have value to a team that needs a cheap outfielder with an extra year of team control. The contract is worth 10 million over 2 years, and he should give you 2 WAR each year for the next 2. That’s a similar value to Alfonso Soriano; a back-end of a team’s top 10 prospects or a few live arms. I’d probably hold off on trading DeJesus if you trade Soriano and slot him at left (someone has to play there, right?). He’d make a mighty fine, affordable, midseason trade chip, and I believe that’s what the Cubs will do.

Better Know a Cub: Luis Valbuena

Luis Valbuena came to the Cubs in 2012 off of the waiver wire, one of a dozen or so pickups the Cubs’ had during the infancy of last season. Unlike most other wire pickups, though, Valbuena was a position player, and one that would see quite a bit of action in a Cubs’ uniform in 2012.

Originally from the Mariners organization, Luis saw a cup of coffee with Seattle in 2008, until December 11, when he was part of a 3-team trade that involved an astonishing 13 players. Valbuena would spend a good amount of time in 2009 and 2010 with Cleveland, though he could never hit above .250/.298/.416 in either year. The Indians tired of his offensive deficiencies, and kept him in Columbus for the bulk of 2011. The Blue Jays purchased his contract in November of 2011, but they waived him and the Cubs picked him up.

In 2012, Luis spent the first third of the season in AAA, and he hit pretty well there. He earned an injury call-up after Stewart went down for the season, and stayed up the rest of the year, hitting .219/.310/.340, “good” for a .290 wOBA. He played above-average defense at the hot corner en route to contributing 0.9 WAR last year.

The Cubs did not upgrade at 3B this off-season, and Theo & Co. have decided to start Vitters in AAA next season. Valbuena and Stewart will be clashing for the starting spot; the loser will be the backup/utility infielder (if Stewart can handle 2B).

Offense

Valbuena is offensively-challenged in much the same way Darwin Barney is. Luis sports a career .283 wOBA and a .269 BABIP. These numbers suggest a lot of room for improvement, and luckily for Luis, there is some. A .269 BABIP is pretty low, and could easily climb to .290 or .300. Bill James projects a .295 BABIP for Valbuena next year, the primary driver for a wOBA of .320, which I think anyone would take from Valbuena (or 3B in general) at this point.

Valbuena doesn’t have much power, especially from 3B, but he has slightly above-average plate discipline and he doesn’t strike out more than average. He’s not fast an a poor baserunner, but the Cubs’ FO minimizes those parts of the game anyway, so it’s not a complete worry.

Defense

Valbuena played pretty good defense at third last year, but before 2012 he had been known basically as defensively inept. He can play 2B/SS/3B/LF, all fairly badly, but passably enough. If the gains from 2012 are real (and defensive metrics take YEARS to have enough data to show trends), he could carve out a little career as a backup infielder that can draw a walk. If he can’t, he’s a AAAA guy.

Summary

Valbuena has three paths to sticking on a major league roster. Either he can realize his 2012 gains with the glove and stick around as a utility infielder, or he can bring up his offensive numbers to where you can live with his poor defense (still as a backup). Lastly, he can be on the Cubs, where we have no other real options. If Stewart never recovers from his wrist, the job is Valbuenas regardless of talent level. I’m not holding my breath that Valbuena will ever have a wOBA above .300, and I’m not holding my breath that he’s suddenly become a defensive stalwart. Luis is organization filler; unfortunately for us, the hole he’s filling in our organization right now might be “starting 3B.”

Better Know a Cub: Travis Wood

Travis Wood is traveling in the wrong direction.

Wood made his debut in the majors in 2010, throwing 102.2 innings of 3.51 ERA ball. He wasn’t lucky, either: his FIP was 3.42. As an age-23 season, it was quite impressive: he even threw a 3.31 K/BB ratio in there for good measure.

He hasn’t repeated his good fortune since. In 2011, his ERA ballooned to 4.84, and his FIP rose to 4.06 as well. His BABIP went a lot higher (.324 from .259), and he lost a K per 9 while gaining a BB per 9. Things were not going in the right direction, and the Reds jettisoned him in the 2011 offseason for premier set-up man Sean Marshall.

As a Cub, his season was arguably worse in 2012. Travis got his ERA down to 4.27, but his FIP climbed all the way to 4.84. His BABIP was crazily, crazily low (.244), so he was generally hit-lucky, but HR-unlucky (his rate essentially doubled to 12.7% HR/FB and 1.44 HR/9).

What Travis Wood will we see in 2013? Will it be the very good 2010 model, or the much worse 2012 version?

Pitch Selection

Wood throws 3 pitches with any regularity, though he’s been mixing in an 80mph slider more this year.

His first offering is an 89 mph fastball. It’s not a very good pitch (below average, by linear weights), but it’s not an absolute killer. He throws it around 50% of the time. His cutter is around 87 mph and he threw it 30% of the time in 2012. PITCHf/x rates it as above average. His changeup makes up another 10% of his pitches, and it’s 80 mph. His changeup was rocked last year, probably because it ended up being a home run nearly every time he threw it. Lastly, Wood mixed in an 80 mph slider 10% of the time last year, and it was surprisingly effective. It was far and away his best pitch according to PITCHf/x last year.

This jives somewhat with the early scouting reports I’ve seen on Wood. Many of them praise his great changeup, but it doesn’t get hitters out at the major league level (and it hasn’t all 3 years). He started developing his cutter around 2009, which has turned into his best pitch, and a weapon he’ll have to use effectively if he wants to stick in the bigs.

Stuff

Travis is never going to overpower major league hitters. He’s essentially average in inducing swings, with the minor exception of not fooling people outside. The problem, though, is that hitters make contact with Wood at an alarming rate outside of the zone. That’s the primary driver for his decreased strikeout rate and very indicate of a lack of dominance. Players that swing at Travis Wood’s pitches make contact at the 12th highest rate in baseball, among contemporaries like Kevin Millwood, Lucas Harrell, and Bronson Arroyo. He’s 6th in the league in O-contact% (the percentage of times a ball is out of the zone, the batter swings, and makes contact anyway). This is the surest recipe for not striking guys out (in fact, Wood’s 6.87 is the highest of the top 10 in this category).

Summary

Travis Wood is never going to strikeout a batter per 9 innings. He’ll likely struggle to strikeout 8 per 9 innings. For this reason, he’ll never amount to more than a #4 or #5 starter (unless he has a preternatural ability to locate his pitches that we haven’t seen yet). I think the ceiling for Wood is very low, but the floor is pretty high. He’s consistenly shown the ability to get some outs in the major league level, and there is value for an innings-eater at the back of less-than-impressive rotations (not a lot of value, but some).

Wood also has shown the ability to retire lefties at a pretty healthy rate (.215/.287/.342), so on a good team, he might be a swingman/LOOGY. As it happens right now, he’s our #5 starter. Time will tell if he can stay that way.

Better Know a Cub: Darwin Barney

Darwin Barney is an odd duck. He doesn’t get on base all that often (.299 OBP last year, .305 career). He has no power (7 HR last year is more than double the amount he has hit in any other year of his professional career). He doesn’t walk (5.6% last year, 2.4% less than the league average). He doesn’t steal bases (6 last year). Offensively, he was pitiful by any standard by any position (7th lowest wOBA in baseball last year, and the 6 players above him are a veritable who’s who of awful players).

And yet, Darwin Barney was slightly better than a league-average 2B last year. How on earth can that be?

Barney had one of the best defensive seasons of all time, a legendary season that saw him break the alltime errorless streak and win the Gold Glove while not hitting a lick. He actually tied Danny Espinosa for the highest total Fld (a FanGraphs Stat) in 2012. He blew the field away in UZR and ErrR.

The big problem with all of this is that I just am not certain that Darwin Barney is the Brooks Robinson of second basemen. Last year, Barney didn’t just provide most of his value with his glove, he provided all of it. What happens next year if he hits .268/.311/.357, as Bill James projects, but only provides a win or two with his glove? Barney quickly becomes a utility infielder, albeit a great defensive one.

There’s no real strength to Barney’s offensive game, and the only thing you can look to for him to improve is him getting hit-lucky (BABIP of .273 last year). His career average is .291, which suggests that he’s just a poor hitter.

However impossible it may be, I’d love to trade Darwin Barney to a team that really appreciates his defensive value (and there is some value to be had there). Barney is rosterable if he can get a wOBA around .300, but only as a utility infielder. If he takes a leap forward (I honestly think he’s overmatched at the MLB level, though; nothing in his minor or major league history points to him being much better than he is right now), he could be a good option at 2nd for some teams that are defense-oriented (the Mariners are a great fit if they are giving on Ackley, one of the 6 players that incredibly had a lower wOBA than Barney last year). In the interim, he’s a fine stopgap until Watkins is ready (late 2013/early 2014 if it all goes well). For what it’s worth, I project that Barney could net a prospect in a team’s 15-20 level- he’s more of a throw-in.

It took a historic, unrepeatable defensive season for Barney to be worth 2.5 wins. Unless he can take a step forward towards mediocrity with the bat, I don’t see that happening again.